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Abstract—This paper examines the role and value of infor-
mation security awareness efforts in defending against social
engineering attacks. It categories the different social engineer-
ing threats and tactics used in targeting employees and the
approaches to defend against such attacks. While we review these
techniques, we attempt to develop a thorough understanding of
human security threats, with a suitable balance between struc-
tured improvements to defend human weaknesses, and efﬁciently
focused security training and awareness building. Finally, the
paper shows that a multi-layered shield can mitigate various
security risks and minimize the damage to systems and data.
Keywords—Social Engineering, Security Awareness, Cyber se-
curity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The frequency and costs of cyber security incidents con-
tinue to rise making it extremely challenging to defend
against today’s attacks. To provide security, various system
components require adequate security measures to guarantee
reasonable or maximum protection of the complete system.
According to [1], this can be achieved via implementing
two levels of security: technical security and administrative
security. Technical security is further classiﬁed into IT security,
involving computer and communication security, and physical
security. All these security levels are aimed at safeguarding
systems against possible intruders and malicious criminals.
Aspiring intruders usually possess three key qualities that
enhance their ability to penetrate secured systems. These are:
method, which entails having the requisite tools, skills and
resources to carry out the attack; opportunity, which involves
access and time for the intruder to perform the attack; and
motive, which is the core reason to execute the attack. With
the resources available online, system knowledge can be easily
acquired with varied attack modes. This, coupled with a
motivation (such as for ﬁnancial reasons, corporate espionage,
data stealing, among others) and time can result in successful
attacks on the targeted system. One particular technique that
has had devastating effects is social engineering.
There is a consensus in the research community that
humans are your weakest link in an information system.
Exploiting human vulnerabilities using phishing techniques
rather than technical ones is becoming the major threat to
the security of information systems. This paper provides the
readers with an overview of social engineering and addresses
the issue of human vulnerabilities. It deﬁnes and classiﬁes
social engineering attack techniques and strategies. It also
presents the current defences approaches against such attacks
to mitigate the risks and minimize the damage to the systems
and data.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II deﬁnes social engineering attack. Social engineering tech-
niques are classiﬁed based on the employed attack strategy in
Section III. Section IV shows the current defences approaches
against social engineering. Section V concludes the paper.
II. WHAT IS SOCIAL ENGINEERING?
According to a report published by the Centre for the
Protection of National Infrastructure [2], social engineering
has been deﬁned based on psychological and security terms
by various organizations and people. In [3], it is deﬁned
as “breaking an organization’s security by interactions with
people”. Another individual, Kevin Mitnick (a hacker once
listed by the FBI as most-wanted), describes it as “taking
advantage of people’s naivety via inﬂuence, persuasion and
manipulation to obtain vital information” [4]. It is further
described as a skill set utilized by an unknown individual to
obtain trust and access to an organization via someone in the
organization and consequently guides them to alter IT system
rights or access that ultimately grants the individual access
rights [1]. In a nutshell, social engineering can be deﬁned as
a breach of organizational security via interaction with people
to trick them into breaking normal security procedures.
Social engineering basically entails exploitation of people’s
common sense to acquire vital or critical company information
(such as user IDs, passwords, or corporate directories) from
unsuspecting employees. For instance, this can be through
convincing an individual, through trickery, to hand over a
password. This technique is usually used by hackers where
technical means have failed to penetrate a target system. As
such, it speciﬁcally targets human psychology and the natural
need for being helpful. In terms of the business environment,
most companies have installed high-tech defense systems, such
as ﬁrewalls, internet server hardening and even use of secure
internal ﬁle transfers, to guard their systems and networks
against unauthorized entry, while overlooking the social as-
pects. It is emerging that the biggest risk to information
security in an organization is not technology-related, rather it is
in the inaction or action of employees and other organisational
personnel that consequently leads to security incidences. For
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instance, an employee may disclose vital information regarding
business systems, e.g. the name of the organisation’s security
platform, on social media that could be used by malicious
attackers for social engineering attacks. In some occasions,
an employee may choose to ignore and not report unusual
activity (related to information breach), or he could gain access
to sensitive information beyond the user’s role and credentials
through unethical means. All these scenarios expose the organ-
isation to security risks with the mishandling of crucial and
sensitive information. Social engineering is also considered
as the most common technique used in Advanced Persistent
Threat (APT) attacks [5].
III. SOCIAL ENGINEERING ATTACK STRATEGIES
A vast number of social engineering attacks exist to acquire
information or access systems through exploiting unsuspecting
employees. Despite the varied modes, the attacks do follow a
typical cycle. These are [6]:
1) Information gathering
2) Development of relationship
3) Exploitation of relationship
4) Execution aimed at objective achievement
The information gathering process can be obtained from
public sources such as web pages, social media posts, phone
books, jobs portals, amongst others, or from a previous social
engineering attacks. The information from this step is utilised
in developing a mutual relationship with targeted persons.
In step 2, relationship development is aimed at creating a
rapport with the target based on known human tendencies
and characteristics of being helpful and trusting. When step
2 is successful, the attacker exploits the target to reveal vital
information such as passwords, credit card numbers, login
details, secret information, amongst others. This information
acquired can either be the ultimate aim of the attack, or the
commencement of the next phase. In the last step the attacker
tries to achieve the ultimate goal, which may involve iteration
of previous steps.
Social engineering techniques can be largely classiﬁed
into two categories: attacks based on the physical locations
(computer-based attack) and attacks based on psychological
means (human-based attack).
A. The Physical Locations
Computer-based attacks rely heavily on technology to ma-
nipulate and trick a target into submitting information required
by the attacker to execute his malicious deeds. For example,
the use of a pop-up window notifying a user that their network
connection has been lost and are required to re-enter their
login details to reconnect. Such information would then be
emailed back to the intruder via an installed program on the
targeted individuals system. It is effective when an attacker has
already had relative system access at a low level. This class of
attacks can be effected based on these three physical settings:
the workplace, by telephone, or online [7].
1) The Workplace:
Through impersonation (say a consultant, trusted third party
or maintenance worker), tailgating, masquerading, or after-
hours entry an attacker can easily stroll into an organization or
company’s main entrance. Once physically inside the premises,
the attacker can “shoulder-surf” or eavesdrop passwords, ob-
tain sensitive documents (carelessly left on employee worksta-
tions), gather passwords, or penetrate the corporate network
(via unguarded network ports). Once the required information
has been gathered, the attacker may exit the premises and
continue exploiting the network remotely, their convenience
[1].
2) By Telephone:
This technique represents one of the most common means
utilized by attackers. This is particularly via an organization’s
help desk. Most attackers prey on organizations’ PBX systems
or customer care help lines within the aim of appearing like
they are calling from within the organization (not from a line
outside the organization). This method allows an attacker to be
relatively anonymous, and remain so, while obtaining informa-
tion such additional telephone numbers, sensitive documents,
passwords, or any other relevant information to the attacker
[8].
3) Online:
This attack-mode is based on several platforms including
online instant messaging platforms, E-mails, via social media
platforms, etc. This is based on several modes of implemen-
tation. For instance, an attacker would want a target to install
malicious programs on their local machines, such as worms
or viruses. An attacker would trick a target into submitting
personal information or passwords through ﬁlling out a form,
commonly referred to as Pharming or Phishing, via legitimate-
looking e-mail requests such as banks from. An attacker
would also obtain detailed information via carrying out of
web searches related to company information in cases where
organisations put up detailed information on their web sites
including services, products, staff details, among others that
would be used in target acquisition. Another method is via
using online curricula vitae through which provide detailed
personal information related to a target’s place of work and
organisational rank to be used in the target acquisition phase
[9].
B. The Psychological Methods
The popular and easier SE mode still remains human-
based. It heavily relies on deception and interpersonal relations
by utilizing speciﬁc techniques such as name-dropping, intimi-
dation, belittling, asserting authority, and ﬂattery. It is based on
utilization of one-to-one communication between the attacker
and the targeted individual. Mostly, this method category heav-
ily relies on carrying out a basic background research, where
information acquisition, on the targeted organization, is carried
out. Some of the techniques used to gather this information
include: shoulder surﬁng and eavesdropping. Once the basic
information acquisition is guaranteed, several methods, as
explained in the next section, are used to manipulate the target
in order to acquire additional information [10].
1) Authority:
Implications and assertions of authority are a source of
effectively gaining vital information from an unsuspecting
target, especially a newly recruited employee or a low-level
staff member. The most commonly used method involves
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an attacker claiming to be from the security department,
IT department, manager, or other high-level authority and
utilising this perceived position obtaining information related
to password resetting or new password through threats or
intimidation. For instance, the attacker may threaten to report a
staff member to their supervisor for incompetence or intimidate
the target staff that they are late in delivering important data
or information to the organisation’s chief executive. Such acts
would see the intimidated or threatened staff member giving
out the information as demanded. It is of note that this method
is highly effective in hierarchical organization [11].
2) Natural Inclination to Help:
Humans have a natural tendency to assist those who are in
need of help. Unfortunately, this aspect is known to social
engineers who take advantage of this human nature. For
instance, a social engineer may impersonate a deliveryman
carrying many boxes into a premises and gain physical access
to a target building when an employee decides to hold open
the door. In another situation, an attacker can impersonate a
desperate employee calling the IT Help Desk for access to the
corporate network from home, resulting in the attacker acquir-
ing sensitive information related to company networks [12].
3) Liking and Similarity:
By carrying out casual conversation, an attacker can gain
insights on a target aimed at developing persona connections.
For instance, sharing similar activities and hobbies, support for
the same sports team, or claiming to birth roots or area. There
is a natural tendency for humans to associate with individuals
of similar interests or origins. In the process, the attacker is
able to establish a rapport making it easier to acquire sensitive
information from the target as they trust them.
4) Commitment and Consistency:
Attackers also exploit employees’ nature of wanting to be
seen as trustworthy and committed to execute their attacks. For
example, an attacker would instruct an employee to execute
a certain task warning of dire consequences or reprimand
if non-compliance is exhibited. This can be implemented by
instructing a new staff member to implement certain security
policies and in the process requiring the target to share their
credentials aimed at ensuring compliance. This results in the
employee sharing their system credentials that the attacker
would use to access the organisation’s system.
5) Reciprocation:
The norm in social interactions dictates that if an individual
gives us something, it will only be courteous to return the
favour. This aspect is referred to as reverse social engineering
[9]. The technique involves the attacker creating a situation
that results in the target encountering a problem, prompting the
said target to seek assistance from the attacker, who resolves
the situation. In return, the victim offers the attacker requested
information, felt as obligated to the attacker.
6) Low Involvement:
This involves the attacker requesting for information or
carrying out a task of employees who have little or no interest
related to the information or task request. This can include
the receptionist, cleaning crew or even the security guard.
These targets are seemingly picked by the attacker due to their
ignorance and an overwhelming sense of assertion of authority
by the attacker, request urgency, and lack of awareness of the
consequence. In this method, vital organisational information
could fall into the hands of the attacker [13].
IV. DEFENCE APPROACHES AGAINST SOCIAL
ENGINEERING ATTACKS
One aspect that distinctly distinguishes social engineering
attacks from technical attacks is the technical level of staff
involved in the act. A typical technical attack would involve
a given combination of staff from the information security
department or the IT department. These targets are highly
knowledgeable in the organisation’s systems in matters related
to security awareness, technical knowledge and ways in which
the systems may be attacked. However, social engineering
attacks target anyone, from the executives in the organisation
to the cleaner who works night shifts. The calibre of employees
targeted may lack technical system knowledge nor be aware
of the security concerns when in their opinion the information
they possess or work with is not regarded as sensitive or clas-
siﬁed. Whereas it would be practically impossible to eliminate
social engineering breaches, the risks can be mitigated and
the damage to systems and data can be minimised. A multi-
layered approach is essential in building a good defence against
social engineering attacks to create a large barrier between
the attacker and the actual access to the system. For instance,
if the attacker penetrates level one, the other levels would
ultimately stop him/her from accessing the system. Some of
these levels already being implemented include: foundational
level, which involves developing a security policy around
social engineering; fortress level, which involves resistance
training for employees at key installations; persistence level,
which involves carrying out ongoing reminders; the offensive
level, which entails responding to incidences; and the gotcha
level, which involves developing SELM (Social Engineering
Land Mines) [1].
A. Improved Physical Security
This forms the basis for implementing a strong social
engineering defence by ensuring valuable and sensitive in-
formation stays within the organisation. Although it can be
easily exploited, especially if the attackers are working from
within the organisation, improvement of physical security can
be a major deterrent to outside attackers against just gaining
physical access and acquiring any information that they may
require.
B. Stronger Security Policy (Foundational Level)
Security policies have a speciﬁed life span that ideally
requires a review date and most importantly maintained in
a current state. To achieve this, policies should be reviewed
regularly and on a rotational basis, with at least 20% of
these policies altered yearly and the entire system in a 5-
year cycle. In case of more volatile policies, these should
be reviewed more frequently. Some of the policies that can
be implemented to guard against social engineering attacks
include matters related to: information release, access ap-
proval, password changes, modems, help desk, employee ID,
shredding conﬁdential documents, etc. On information release,
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the policy should have clear guidelines on the personnel and
circumstances under which information can be released to the
public. For example, all organisational surveys would be desig-
nated to a speciﬁc employee. Access approval matters related
to the policy should include: signing of security agreement
prior to granting access, authority and type of access to the
system that various employees wield, have a clear guideline
on account creation and termination methods, and have deﬁned
account creation procedures to ensure elimination of mistakes
and confusion.
In terms of password changes, the policy should require
a strong combination of characters, including lower, upper,
special, and numbers while also setting out the frequency
of password changes. On edge devices, a good policy will
prohibit use of such devices on the organisation’s intranet since
they would bypass company ﬁrewalls, creating an open door.
There can be an audit in place by the IT staff to verify that
such devices are not being installed. The help desk should
have a clear policy related to giving out information and
passwords. A good policy would require veriﬁcation of the
employee based on a number of laid out procedures. In terms
of the employee ID, an organisation may develop a policy
used in identiﬁcation of all the organisation’s staff (e.g. by
wearing an ID tag with a picture of the employee). In addition,
visitors would be required to register and assign a temporary
ID tag that should be worn. Anyone not complying with these
requirements should be reported. Finally, there should be a
shredding policy that affects all sensitive documents to avoid
the use of the “dumpster diving” technique. Violations of any
of the security policies should have a clear and well-known
procedure that employees can follow to report failures to
comply incidents. Moreover, there should be life cycle policies
related to the information system life cycle. This entails storage
and destruction of both hardware and data that is no longer
required by the organisation [14].
C. Response to Security Infringements (Persistence and
Fortress Level)
This involves implementing resistance-training techniques
for key personnel, carrying out ongoing reminders, and punish-
ing staff who continuously break policy controls. Resistance-
training techniques are aimed at making employees resilient
against persuasion techniques that a social engineer may em-
ploy. These may include: inoculation, which involves furnish-
ing the organisation’s employees with possible weakened argu-
ments a social engineer may attempt to use along with rebuttal
argument responses the staff member may use; Forewarning,
which entails warning of employees on the possible content
of upcoming messages that may come from attackers who
will use insincere, deceptive, and manipulative language aimed
at stealing information; and Reality check, which encom-
passes demonstrating the realities of security threats by social
engineers to employees by actually demonstrating a social
engineering attack on them to show their vulnerability [15].
Carrying out ongoing reminders is a necessity of security
consciousness. The ability of employees to resist attempts by a
social engineer can only be realised within a short time frame.
Creative and regular reminders are mandatory to ensure the
staff are aware of any lurking dangers from conversations via
email, instant messaging, social media or even phone calls. A
good example is an illustration of recent social engineering
attempts to the employees that may have been successful or
were thwarted. This would ensure that employees are reminded
of attacker attempts at any given time making them cautious
in their interactions with outsiders.
D. Incidence Handling Procedures (Offensive Level and
Gotcha level)
Besides having knowledge on when social engineering
attacks may take place, it is equally important to have requisite
knowledge on what actions to take in the course of an
attack. The two techniques that can be used in such situations
are: laying of Social Engineering Land Mines (SELMs) and
Incidence response. SELMs refers to system traps laid to stop
or expose an attack. As the name suggests, they are usually
set to “explode”, by surprise, in an attacker’s face. In the
process, it exposes the attack’s secrecy, cripple the process
and eventually stop the attack. In addition, SELM will notify
the victim’s system and the victim of the attempt to enable
additional security measures to be implemented immediately.
Some of the techniques applied include: a Justiﬁed Know-it-
all, who represents a person well versed with all employees in
a department and can easily identify an intruder and quickly
implement security mechanisms in case one is spotted; cen-
tralised security log, which involves logging and monitoring
of all security events in a central ﬁle and where irregular
patterns can be easily identiﬁed and relevant employees warned
of impending attack; having a Call Back policy, which would
require system administrators and Help desk personnel calling
back any employees requesting for questionable information
or password reset aimed at verifying the true identity of the
caller; Key questions, which encompasses having a number
of questions asked to anyone requesting for password resets
or internal information to verify their identity (an example is
the 3 Questions Rule); and the “Please Hold” policy, which
involves putting on hold any suspicious requests for purposes
of seeking additional information from other sources related
to the request prior to responding, to ensure it is legitimate, or
requires further veriﬁcation, or should be denied entirely [16].
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Social Engineering attacks are serious threat to information
security. They are exploited to acquire information or system
access from unsuspecting employees. This paper has presented
a background on social engineering attack, classiﬁed social
engineering techniques and strategies and reviewed the current
defence approaches against such attacks.
Based on recent large scale social engineering attacks, it
is evident that addressing human security weaknesses is not
high on the targeted companies agendas. Even now, most
employees outside the IT department believe that information
security is an IT issue. This work advocates information
security is not the responsibility of a single user, instead, it is
the responsibility of all users associated with an organisation,
from the cleaning team to the sales representatives, admin
staff to security managers. It is vital to educate employees
about cyber security issues and threats. Security awareness is a
powerful instrument in the battle against cybercrime. In reality
the distinction between personal life and work life can become
convoluted, for example the concept of BYOD (bring your own
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device). If a user shares personal information on social media,
this could pose a threat to the company of the user. Social
engineering attacks can use this personal information against
an organisation.
In the current ﬁnancial climate, companies have cut their
training budgets and investment in IT security solutions to
record levels. This motivates our future work to develop a
security awareness program aiming to achieve two related
objectives: awareness, whose aim is to raise the collective
importance of security controls and security as a whole; and
training, is aimed at facilitating increased in-depth understand-
ing by the system user. Because ﬁnding a portion of the
training budget to deal with human security can be a real
challenge, the desired training program will employ context
aware self-learning approach that allows individuals to learn
about the security risks related to the task currently at hand.
Such an approach will save companies a fortune on expensive
training programs and will give employees the ability to learn
by example. This method particularly suits the non-technical
audience.
REFERENCES
[1] M. I. Mann, Hacking the human: social engineering techniques and
security countermeasures. Gower Publishing, Ltd., 2012.
[2] CPNI, “Social engineering: Understanding the threat,” http://www.
cpni.gov.uk/documents/publications/2013/2013065-social-engineering.
pdf?epslanguage=en-gb, accessed: 25-3-2016.
[3] M. Bezuidenhout, F. Mouton, and H. S. Venter, “Social engineering
attack detection model: Seadm,” in Information Security for South
Africa (ISSA), 2010. IEEE, 2010, pp. 1–8.
[4] K. D. Mitnick and W. L. Simon, The art of deception: Controlling the
human element of security. John Wiley & Sons, 2011.
[5] I. Ghaﬁr and V. Prenosil, “Proposed approach for targeted attacks
detection,” in Advanced Computer and Communication Engineering
Technology. Springer, 2016, pp. 73–80.
[6] A. Algarni, Y. Xu, T. Chan, and Y.-C. Tian, “Social engineering in
social networking sites: Affect-based model,” in Internet Technology
and Secured Transactions (ICITST), 2013 8th International Conference
for. IEEE, 2013, pp. 508–515.
[7] S. Abraham and I. Chengalur-Smith, “An overview of social engineering
malware: Trends, tactics, and implications,” Technology in Society,
vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 183–196, 2010.
[8] J.-W. Bullee, L. Montoya, M. Junger, and P. Hartel, “Telephone-based
social engineering attacks: An experiment testing the success and time
decay of an intervention,” 2016.
[9] D. Irani, M. Balduzzi, D. Balzarotti, E. Kirda, and C. Pu, “Reverse
social engineering attacks in online social networks,” in Detection of
intrusions and malware, and vulnerability assessment. Springer, 2011,
pp. 55–74.
[10] J. Long, No tech hacking: A guide to social engineering, dumpster
diving, and shoulder surﬁng. Syngress, 2011.
[11] F. Mouton, L. Leenen, and H. Venter, “Social engineering attack
examples, templates and scenarios,” Computers & Security, 2016.
[12] J. Goodchild, “Social engineering: The basics,” CSO Online, 2012.
[13] D. Kvedar, M. Nettis, and S. P. Fulton, “The use of formal social
engineering techniques to identify weaknesses during a computer vul-
nerability competition,” Journal of Computing Sciences in Colleges,
vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 80–87, 2010.
[14] S. Satish, “Educating computer users concerning social engineering
security threats,” Feb. 10 2015, uS Patent 8,955,109.
[15] X. R. Luo, R. Brody, A. Seazzu, and S. Burd, “Social engineering:
The neglected human factor for,” Managing Information Resources and
Technology: Emerging Applications and Theories: Emerging Applica-
tions and Theories, p. 151, 2013.
[16] K. Beckers, L. Krautsevich, and A. Yautsiukhin, “Using attack graphs
to analyze social engineering threats,” International Journal of Secure
Software Engineering (IJSSE), vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 47–69, 2015.
149
